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APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District for Ada County.
The Honorable Samuel A. Hoagland, District Judge, presiding.
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Dayton Patrick Reed residing in Boise, ID for Respondents.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................................ 1
NATURE OF THE CASE .................................................................................................................................... 4

I.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ................................................................................ ................................................. 6
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL ....................................................................................................................... 8

TV. ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................................................... 9
A . STANDARD OF REVlEW .................... ............................................................... .................... .................................. ...... 9

B. THE B OARD IN DETERMINING "GOOD CAUSE" USED AN INCORRECT STANDARD OF REV!EW.................................... 10
C.

THE ORDER Is NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.................................................................................. 16

D. THE ORDER I S ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS........................................................................................................... 17
E.

THE ORDER VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS C LAUSE .................................................................................................. 18

F.

THE ORDER PREJUDICES PETITIONER'S SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS................................................................................ 19

V. CONCLUSION ........................................................................ ...........................................................................20

APPELLANT'S BRIEF Page I 1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, !05 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d I 067 {1983) ................................................... 12
American Lung Assoc. ofidaho/Nevada v. Dept. of Ag., 142 ldaho 544, 547 (2006) ............................................... 19
Bradley v. Washington Group Intern, 141 Idaho 655, 115 P.3d 746 (Idaho 2005) ..................................................... 12
Bradley, 141 Idaho at 658 ................................................................................................. .......................................... 13
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) ........................................................................................................................ 20
In re IDWR Amended Final Order Creating Water Dist. No. 170, 148 Idaho 200, 212 (2009) .................................. 18
Kalani-Keegan, 155 Idaho at 30 I, 311 P.3d at 313 ..................................................................................................... 21
Medrano v. Neibaur, 136 Idaho 767, 40 P.3d 125 (2002) ........................................................................................... 13
Medrano, 136 Idaho at 769, 40 P.3d at 127 ........... ...................................................................................................... 13
Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 ldaho 340,343, 160 P.3d 1275, 1278 (Ct. App. 2007) ....................................................... 20
Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342 (Idaho l 997) ....................................................................................... 14, 17
Sanders Orchard v. Gem Cty. ex rel. Bd. of Cty. Comm 'rs, 137 Idaho 695, 702, 52 P.3d 840, 847 (2002) ............... 20
Sanders Orchard v. Gem Cty. ex rel. Bd. ofCty. Comm'rs, 137 Idaho at 702, 52 P.3d at 847................................... 20
State Transp. Dep't v. Kalani-Keegan, 155 Idaho 297, 301,311 P.3d 309, 313 (Ct. App. 2013) ............................... 21
State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 542,544, 211 P.3d 787, 789 (Ct. App. 2009) ........................................................................ 19
Tappen v. IDHW, 98 Idaho 576, 579-80 (1977)......................................................................................................... 17
Terrazas v. Blaine Cty. ex rel. Board of Commissioners, 147 Idaho 193, 205 (2009) ................................................ 19

Statutes
ldaho Code§ 67-5279(3)(d) .................................................... .................................................................................... 17
Idaho Code Section I 12{5) .......................................................................................................................................... 17

APPELLANT'S BRIEF Page

I2

Idaho Code. §67-5277 ................................................................................................................................................. 11
Section 112 (5) ............................................................................................................................................................ 16

Rules
I.D.A.P.A. Rule 741 ........................................................................................................................................ 15, 16, 17

I.R.C.P. 36(b) .............................................................................................................................................................. 17
I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2) ............................................................................................................................................................ 17
IDAPA § 04.l I.0l.741 ........................................................................................................................ ........................ 14
Rule 4(a)(2) ...................... ........................................................................................................................................... 14

Constitutional Provisions
Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13 ...................................... ........................................................................................................ 19
U.S. Const. amend. XlV .............................................................................................................................................. 19

APPELLANT'S BRIEF Page

I3

I. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the Board of Pharmacy and the Idaho Fourth District
Court denying the payment of mandatory attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section
12-117(5). Petitioner seeks relief from the agency's order denying attorney's fees as
untimely. Petitioner appealed the final agency action to the District Court. The District
court upheld the agency action denying attorney's fees.
Petitioner holds a Pharmacy License in Idaho, California and Nevada and has
been a practicing pharmacist for approximately twenty-nine (29) years. There was no
evidence in the record of any prior disciplinary complaints against Petitioner in any of
the licensed jurisdictions. R., p. 109, para 3-4.
On July 14, 2018, Petitioner was the Pharmacist-in-Charge ("PIC") at Sav-On
184 located on South Federal Way in Boise, ID. R., p. I 09, para 7. On September 25,
2018, the Board Compliance Office conducted a routine inspection of Sav-On 184. R.,
p. 110, para. 8. During the inspection, the Compliance Officer did not find a valid
prescription in the electronic pharmacy records at Sav-On 184. ID. R., p. 110, para 10.
Per testimony at the hearing Petitioner had rejected the initial Trarnadol prescription
presented on July 14, 2018, because it failed to contain the necessary information for a
valid prescription. R., p. 110, para 10. Due to the immediate rejection the prescription
was never scanned into the electronic recordkeeping system. R., p. 110, para 11.
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Following the rejection, the patient's owner (patient was a dog) returned to Sav-On 184
with a new prescription. R. , p. 110, para 12. This prescription was rejected by Petitioner
for failing to include infom1ation necessary for a valid prescription (the drug name and
strength). R., p. 110 -111.
Petitioner rejected the second prescription and contacted the prescribing
physician to obtain the information necessary to create a valid prescription. Petitioner
prepared the verbal prescription to writing and provided the written prescription to the
pharmacy technician for processing. Petitioner dispensed the prescription for Tramadol
50 mg, a Schedule IV medication to the patient's owners. The written prescription
created by Petitioner based on the telephone conversation with the prescribing physician
was never scanned into Sav-On 184 electronic records system by the Pharmacy
Technician. R., p. 111.
On November 20, 2018, the physician provided Petitioner with the patient's
records stating the physician had prescribed Trarnadol 50 mg for the patient on July 14,
2018.

Additionally, the physician provided a letter in which she confirmed the

Tramadol prescription was verified over the phone by Petitioner. The Board found
Petitioner contacted Dr. Stone by telephone on July 14, 2018 and obtained the necessary
information to create a valid prescription. The Board further found Petitioner had
reduced the phone call with the physician to writing creating a valid prescription for the
Tramadol.

However, the valid prescription was never scanned into the electronic
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records system due to a staff error.

The Board found no evidence in the record

suggesting Petitioner was attempting to divert any drugs. R., p. 110 - 112.
The Board found Petitioner's conduct in rejecting two (2) insufficient
prescriptions for Tramadol and contacting the physician by phone to obtain the
necessary information for the prescription was reasonable.

II. Procedural History
The original hearing came before the Board on April 11, 2019, involving a
complaint filed by the staff against Petitioner. After the Board reviewed the exhibits,
testimony, and arguments the Board found in favor of Petitioner. In addressing the
award of attorney fees to Petitioner the Board originally denied the request. However,
the Board's attorney informed the Board, because Petitioner was the prevailing party
attorney's fees and defense costs were mandatory pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-

l 17(5).
On May 6, 2019, the Board entered a Final Order dismissing the allegations set
forth in the complaint against Petitioner. R., p. I 08 - 113.
Notice of Due Process Rights ("Notice") was part of the Final Order. R., p. 104.
Neither the Notice nor the Final Order stated a deadline for requesting attorney fees.
However, the Notice did state a motion for reconsideration must be filed in fourteen
(14) days and an appeal must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days. Petitioner's
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attorney calendared these dates but failed to calendar the date for attorney's fees and
costs as no specific date was mentioned in the Final Order.
On December 11 , 2019, Petitioner's attorney filed a Declaration supporting
payment of reasonable attorney's fees and costs. R., p. 114.
On December 24, 2019, agency staff via their attorney filed an Opposition to the
Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs stating Petitioner' s request was untimely, and no
good cause was shown to explain the delay. R., p. 118. Board staff relied on IDAPA
Rule 04.1 l.01.741 (c) stating if the Final Order is silent as to the deadline for filing for
attorney's fees, the deadline is fourteen ( 14) days from the service date of the final order.
On January 8, 2020, Petitioner' s attorney sent an email to Ali Breshears, Deputy
Attorney General, Contracts & Administrative Law Division, with a cc: to Steven Olsen
and Dayton Reed of the Attorney General's Office- Civil Division, informing them she
would be preparing a declaration concerning her health conditions regarding this matter
and asking if a hearing on this matter could be alleviated. No reply was received
concerning this inquiry. R., p 125.
On February 11, 2020, a Notice of Hearing scheduling a hearing for April 9,
2020, at 11 :00 am, to rule on the Request for Attorney's Fees. R., p 126 -129.
On April l, 2020, an Amended Notice of Hearing rescheduling the hearing to
10:00 am on April 9, 2020, and allowing for virtual attendance due to the COVID-19
pandemic. R., p 130 -133.
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On March 30, 2020, Petitioner filed a Second Declaration in Support of the
Request for Attorney's Fees showing good cause why the Request for Attorney's Fees
should be considered even if it is detennined to be untimely. R., p. 134 -138.
On April 3, 2020, agency staff filed a response stating Petitioner's Second
Declaration did not address what specific events between May 2019 and December 2019
prevented her from filing or seeking an extension of time to file, R., p 139-146.
On April 8, 2020, a Response in Support of Delay in Filing Declaration Under
Oath for Attorney Fees and Costs was filed by Petitioner stating in part the Board must
consider if the delay caused the agency any prejudice. R., p. 147 - 163.
On May 27, 2020, Petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Review. R., p 86 - 100.
On September 24, 2020, Respondent's Brief was filed. R., p. 35 - 60.
On October 15, 2020, Petitioner's Reply Brief was filed. R., p 25 - 34.
On December 8, 2020, a hearing was held before the Honorable Samuel A.
Hoagland, District Judge.
On January 13, 2020, Judge Hoagland filed a Memorandum Decision and Order
dismissing the Petition for Judicial Review. R., p. 7-16.
On February 24, 2021, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. R., p4 - 6.

III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Pursuant Idaho Code Section 12-117(5) Petitioner seeks attorney's fees from
Respondents. Section 12-117(5) provides in relevant part:
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... in any administrative proceeding or administrative judicial proceeding
involving as adverse parties a licensing authority and a licensee, the prevailing
party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable attorney's fees and reasonable
investigative or defense costs ...
In addition, 54-1728(7) provides in relevant part:

The assessment of costs and fees incurred in the investigation and prosecution
or defense of a person holding a license or registration, ... under this chapter
shall be governed by the provisions of section 12-117(5), Idaho Code.
Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to attorney's fees if she prevails in this appeal.

IV. ARGUMENT

A. Standard of Review
Judicial review of the Board's Order is governed by Idaho Code §§67-5270 through 675279. The applicable standard ofreview is found in Idaho Code. §67-5279(3)
The Comt shall affirm the agency's decision unless the Court finds that the agency's
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
a)

In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

b)

In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

c)

Made upon unlawful procedures;

d)

Not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or

e)

Arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion.

If the agency' s actions are not affirmed, the order shall be set aside, in whole or in part,
and remanded for further proceedings, as necessary. Idaho Code §67-5277
Petitioner is entitled to relief pursuant to Idaho Code Section 67-5270 et. seq. because the
Board abused its discretion by applying an incorrect standard of review required by law. The
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Board did not consider, nor did it find any prejudice caused by an untimely request for attorney's
fees.
Furthennore, Petitioner is entitled to relief because:
I)

The staff's attorney erroneously interpreted and misrepresented Idaho law and

rules.
2)

The Order is not supported by evidence when considering the whole record

before the Court.
3)

The Board did not find any prejudice caused to the agency by the untimely

request for attorney's fees.
4)

The Order is inconsistent with the laws and rules of the state ofldaho and does

not state facts or reasons to demonstrate a rational basis for these inconsistencies.
5)

The Order is arbitrary and capricious.

B. The Board in determining "Good Cause" used an incorrect standard of review.
The Board and the District Court incorrectly held that prejudice is not required
in deciding whether good cause exits. The District Court further held Petitioner did not
point to any language in the rules requiring a showing of prejudice, because there is
none. R., p 11. Petitioner submits this statement is false and is not supported by case
law or statute. As background information for this court, when the Board dismissed the
underlying administrative complaint, they were unaware the Idaho Code Section
2117(5) was amended in 2018, requiring the prevailing party be awarded attorney's fees.
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Given the discussion at the April 11, 2019, hearing concerning awarding attorney fees
to Petitioner the Board originally denied an award of attorney fees. However, Board's
counsel informed the Board attorney fees were mandatory under Idaho Code Section
12-117(5). Petition maintains the Board failed to give a specific date to file a declaration
and failed to state the rule in the Notice of Due Process in an attempt to avoid paying
attorney fees.
In Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067
(1983), the Court upheld a district court's allowance of an untimely request for attorney
fees by the filing of an amended memorandum of costs. The Acarrequi Court stated the
time periods allowed under Rule 54 may be enlarged at the discretion of the trial court.
There was no harm or prejudice to the other party and found no abuse of discretion or
error. (Emphasis added.)

In Bradley v. Washington Group Intern, 141 Idaho 655, 115 P.3d 746 (Idaho
2005), the issue before the Idaho Supreme Court was whether the Commission, after
determining that Bradley was entitled to his attorney fees could then refuse to award
Bradley attorney fees because of what it perceived to be insufficient documentation filed
by Bradley to support an attorney fee award. The Supreme Court found the Commission
did abuse its discretion when it refused to award Bradley attorney fees.
The Court stated in Bradley as follows:
As set forth in Medrano v. Neibaur, 136 Idaho 767, 40 P.3d 125 (2002), this
Court employs a three-part test to determine whether a lower tribunal has
abused its discretion. The test is:
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(1) Whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries
of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to
the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Medrano, 136 Idaho at
769, 40 P.3d at 127
The Commission recognized that its decision as to the amount of
attorney fees to be awarded to Bradley was discretionary. However, the
Commission did not act "within the outer boundaries of its discretion,"
nor did it act "consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it" in denying any award. Bradley, 141
Idaho at 658.

In 2018 the Idaho State Legislature amended Idaho Code§ 12-117(5) requiring
administrative actions by state agency pay reasonable investigative and defense costs to
the prevailing parties. The legislative Statement of Purpose for this amendment states
the prevailing party, in an administrative procedure between a licensee and a licensing
authority, is entitled to recover reasonable investigative and defense costs. To the extent
licensure authorities bring licensure actions in which they cannot prevail, they will owe
reasonable and appropriate defense costs and attorney's fees to licensees.

The

assessment of fees in such proceedings will be subject to judicial review if judicial
review is requested. R., p. 156.
The plain language in this statute mandates attorney's fees be paid to Petitioner.
Refusing to pay the attorney's fees because the request was filed more than fourteen (14)
days after the service of the Order is a gross miscarriage ofjustice and violates the clear
legislative intent of the law. Furthermore, it is an abuse of discretion for the Board to
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flatly refuse to consider all the facts before it in this case, specifically any prejudice
caused the agency by allowing an untimely request for payment of attorney's fees.
Under IDAPA § 04.11.01.741 (d) ORDERS REGARDING COSTS AND/OR FEES UNTIMELY FILING. The Agency may exercise its discretion to consider and grant an
untimely filing for costs and/or fees for good cause shown. The Board is required when
considering an untimely request for attorney' s fees whether the party has shown "good
cause" for any delay in filing.
The Board' s staff via their attorney represented to the Board in their Response
"Whether there is prejudice to the Board of Pharmacy for Respondent's failure to timely
file is not a reason that can be considered when deciding if there was good cause for
Respondent's untimely file." R., p 140.
The above statement is a clear misrepresentation of the law by the staffs
attorney and mislead the Board into believing they did not need to consider whether the
agency was prejudiced or harmed by the delay. The staff attorney's reliance on Sammis
v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342 (Idaho 1997) is questionable. Although in Sammis
the court did hold under I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2) a consideration of prejudice to the defendants
is irrelevant to a determination of good cause (see page 348) it recognized Rule 4(a)(2)
as a "shall rule" not a "may rule." The Court identified the difference between "shall
rules" and "may rules" later in the case and found if the rule is permissive prejudice to
a party must be considered. If the board does not take prejudice into account it has
abused its discretion.
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In Sammis the court held the correct stand of review to apply to motions under
I.R.C.P. 36(b) is the abuse of discretion standard. (page 352). By its terms, this rule
vests the court with discretion. The rule does not require the court to allow
withdrawal or amendment. Rather it permits the court to do so where two
requirements are met: (1) the merits of the action will be subserved by allowing
withdrawal or amendment, and (2) the opposing party does not demonstrate that
withdrawal or amendment will prejudice that party. (Emphasis added pg 352)
Likewise, I.D.A.P.A. Rule 741 provides similar language:
741. ORDERS REGARDING COSTS AND/OR FEES (RULE 74 1).

01. Scope of Rule. This rule provides procedures for considering requests for
costs and/or fees (including attorneys' fees) when an agency has authority to
award costs and/or fees under other provisions of law. This rule is not a source
of authority for awarding costs and/or fees.
02. Time for Filing for Costs and/or Fees Awarded in Final Order or
Preliminary Order. Unless otherwise provided by statute or rule of the
agency:
a. Minimum time for filing. When a final order or a preliminary order
of the agency awards costs and/ or fees to a party or to the agency
itself, the agency must allow no fewer than fourteen (14) days from the
service date of the final order or the preliminary order for the party to
whom costs and/or fees were awarded or for the agency to file
necessary papers (e.g., a memorandum of costs, affidavits, exhibits,
etc.) quantifying and otherwise supporting costs or fees, or both, that
will be claimed or a motion to extend the time to file for costs and fees.
b. Longer time allowed. The final order or preliminary order of the
agency may extend the time to fi le papers for costs and/or fees beyond
fourteen ( 14) days after the service date of the final order or
preliminary order.
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c. When time not set forth. If statute, rules of the agency, and the
final order or preliminary order of the agency are silent on the time for
filing for costs and/or fees the deadline for filing for costs and/or fees
and/or for moving for an extension of the time to file for costs and fees
is fourteen (14) days from the service date of the final order or
preliminary order.
d. Untimely fllin2. The agency may exercise its discretion to consider
and grant an untimely filing for costs and/or fees for good cause shown.
e. Contents of filing. No particular form for filing for costs and fees is
required, but in the absence of a statute or rule providing for standard
costs and/or fees the papers supporting a claim for costs and/or fees
should ordinarily contain an affidavit or declaration under oath
detailing the costs and/or fees claimed.
f. Supplemental filings. Paragraphs 741.02.a. through 741.02.e. of
this rule do not prohibit a party or the agency from supplementing a
filing for costs and/or fees.

The Board may exercise its discretion to consider and grant an untimely filing
for costs and/or fees for good cause shown. I.D.A.P.A. Rule 741 has permissive
language along with the phrase "good cause." By its terms, the rule vests the Board
with discretion. As a side note, the Scope of the Rule applies to an agency who has
authority to award costs but does not address the mandatory attorney's fees found in
Section 112 (5) which bringing into question whether this rule applies to the present
case. I.D.A.P.A. Rule 741 was last amended in 2011. More than six (6) years before
Idaho Code Section 112(5) was amended. As of the filing of this appeal no
amendment has been recommended to incorporate mandatory attorney fees into the
Rule.
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In Sammis the court had two different standards of review depending on
which rule they were evaluating. During the hearing Staffs attorney failed to point
this out to the Board even after it was brought to his attention by Petition er's counsel.
And the district court failed to address this in the Memorandum Decisio n and Order.
The Sammis court specifically distinguished I.R.C.P. 36(b) from l.R.C.P. 4(a)(2). The
court held if a rule or statute is permissive you must look at the lower court's exercise
of its discretion. l.D.A.P.A. Rule 741 is penniss ive therefore, it requires a review of
all the facts and circumstances surrounding the issue of "good cause" including, any
prejudice or harm the delay caused the agency. The abuse of discretion standard
requires a determination of prejudice. Sammis held where a lower court, in the
exercise of its discretion, does not apply the correct legal test or conside r the factors
laid out in an applicable rule or statute the court has abused that discretio n. Sammis
pg.352
C. The Order Is

ot Supported by Substantial Evidence.

A finding of fact without any basis in the record is clearly erroneous. Tappen v.
IDHW, 98 Idaho 576, 579-80 (1977). Indeed, any finding or conclus ion must be
supported by substantial evidence. [daho Code § 67-5279(3)(d).

"[S]ubstantial

evidence" is "relevant evidence that a reasonab le mind might accept to support a
conclusion." In re IDWR Amended Final Order Creating Water Dist.
Idaho 200, 212 (2009).
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o. 170, 148

The Board denied Petitioner's Request for Attorney's Fees on the grounds the Board
did not find good cause existed to warrant a delay of more than six months. The district
Court found the decision of the Board was supported by substantial and competent
evidence. The Court erroneously states that Petitioner's attorney did not detail health
issues over the seven-month time period at issue.
That is a false statement. Petitioner's attorney stated she was suffering from
extreme fatigue. She was suffering from this during the months before submitting the
Declaration for attorney's fees.

Subsequently she was diagnosed with bullous

pemphigoid which is a rare autoimmune disease. However, since she had a stem cell
transplant and has a new immune system it defies current medical knowledge how to
exactly categorize her illness. Both the Board and the District Court grossly minimized
the medical condition of Petitioner's attorney. Her new normal is constantly in a state
of flux. Living without chronic fatigue and bullous pemphigoid may never occur. To
discount the extreme fatigue and anxiety caused by living with a life threating condition
is unfair and a gross miscarriage of justice. The Board abused its discretion by not
considering all the underlying facts. Additionally, the agency suffered no prejudice in
the delay.
D. The Order Is Arbitrary and Capricious.
An agency decision is "arbitrary" if it was done in disregard of the facts and

circumstances presented or without adequately detem1ining principles." American Lung
Assoc. ofldaho/Nevada v. Dept. of Ag., 142 Idaho 544, 547 (2006) An agency decision
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is "capricious" if it "was done without a rational basis." Id.

Additionally, an agency

decision is arbitrary and capricious if it lacks "a thorough and detailed discussion of
why it came to the specified conclusions." Terrazas v. Blaine Cty. ex rel. Board of
Commissioners, 147 Idaho 193, 205 (2009). The Order is both arbitrary and capricious.
It provides no discussion (much less a thorough and detailed one) regarding why it
reached its conclusions. The board decl ined to determine prejudice, failed to appreciate
the ongoing health issues. Additionally, the board refused to or hear any evidence on
either of those issues. Given these facts it is clear the order is arbitrary and capricious
and must be overru led.
E. The Order Violates the Due Process Clause.
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and the Idaho
Constitution prohibits the government from depriving any person "of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const. art. 1, §
13. This right "requires that a person involved in the judicial [or administrative] process
be g iven meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard." State v. D oe,

147 Idaho 542,544, 211 P.3d 787, 789 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 ( 1972)); see also Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340,343, 160 P.3d 1275, 1278
(Ct. App. 2007) ("[P]rocedural due process requires an opportunity to be heard."). In
administrative proceedings, due process principles prohibit an agency from "basing its
decision on an issue upon which no evidence was presented," at least where the agency
did not provide the parties with "notice that the [agency] may base its decision upon the
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issue." Sanders Orchard v. Gem Cty. ex rel. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 137 Idaho 695, 702,
52 P.3d 840, 847 (2002) Where an agency decision violates these principles, it "must
be vacated." Id. Here, the Board refused to consider prejudice thereby precluding
Petitioner an opportunity to be heard regarding whether the agency suffered any
prejudice or harm and determine good cause existed for the delay. At the hearing,
Petitioner provided evidence regarding the reason for the delay in filing the request for
attorney's fees. R., p. 80. In response, the Board did not present any evidence of injury
or prejudice. And never raised the potential prejudice the Request for Attorney's Fees
caused. Transcript of Recorded Hearing 4/9/2020, p. 80. On the misrepresentation by
staff counsel the Board did not concern themselves with issues of prejudice.
Consequently, this violates Petitioner's due process rights. The only way to remedy the
due process violation is to overrule the Order. Sanders Orchard v. Gem Cty. ex rel. Bd.
of Cty. Comm'rs, 137 Idaho at 702, 52 P.3d at 847
F. The Order Prejudices Petitioner's Substantive Rights.
The Order prejudices Petitioner's substantive right to a reasonably fair decisionmaking process. "Generally, as a procedural matter, all the parties involved in [an
administrative] decision have a substantial right to a reasonably fair decision-making
process. . . . This includes the right for all interested parties to have a meaningful
opportunity to present evidence to the governing board on salient factual issues." State
Transp. Dep't v. Kalani-Keegan, 155 Idaho 297, 301, 311 P.3d 309,313 (Ct. App. 2013)
(internal citations omitted). As discussed above, Petitioner was deprived a meaningful
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opportunity to present evidence regarding the lack of prejudice. By failing to give
Petitioner such an opportunity, Petitioner's fundamental rights were prejudiced. See
Kalani-Keegan, 155 Idaho at 301 , 311 P.3d at 313. For these reasons, the Order violated
Petitioner's substantive rights and must be set aside.

V. CONCLUSION

The plain meaning ofldaho case law and statutes mandates attorney fees be paid.
Refusing to pay the attorney fees because the request was filed more than fourteen (14)
days after the service of the Order is a gross miscarriage of justice and violates the clear
legislative intent.
The Board in its discretion has the authority to extend the time and may extend
it if good cause is shown. Petitioner's attorney's health justifies an extension of time.
No evidence of prejudice or hardship occurred or will occur to the agency by extending
the time. Justice and legislative intent will be served in extending the time and requiring
the agency to pay Petitioner's attorney fees. Petitioner's request is reasonable and
demonstrates good cause exists to set aside the Order and award attorney fees.
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Furthennore, it is an abuse of discretion for the Board to flatly refuse to consider all the
facts currently before it in this matter, including but not limited to, the fact no prejudice
or hardship occurred or will occur to the agency if the time is extended.
Respectfully submitted,

Bernadette C Buentgen
Attorney for the Petitioner
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Dated June 14, 2021

